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ABSTRACT 
 
Public firm is required to implement good corporate governance as assurance to reduce 
information asymmetry between firm and its stockholders. Corporate governance mechanism 
should be able to limit any improper actions of the firm’s management. This study 
investigates whether the duality role of the board affects earnings management practice of 
firms making initial public offering at Indonesian Stock Exchange. The study also examines 
other corporate governance mechanism factors, namely the number of board of commission-
ners, the proportion of independent board of commissioners, size of firm, financial leverage, 
and profitability. Earnings management was measured using Cross-Sectional Modified Jones 
model. The study employs a total of 60 firms that went public from 2000 to 2006. The results 
show that duality status of board of commissioners positively and significantly affects 
earnings management in IPO firms. This could be interpreted that board of directors with 
duality role had a lower function in monitoring the firms’ performance so that management 
have opportunity to manage reported earnings. When board of commissioners have dual role, 
the level of earnings management is getting intense, and vice versa. Size of board of 
commissioners and profitability are positively related to earnings management. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
When making Initial Public Offering (IPO), a 
firm will issue prospectus which largely contains 
information related to financial data. Yet, in IPO 
setting, manager has strong motivation to opportu-
nistically alter reported earnings, namely earnings 
management, in an effort to obtain investors’ 
positive valuation (Healy, 2000). Earnings manage-
ment is not uncommon in an IPO setting (Friedlan, 
1994; Teoh et al, 1998).  
Following financial scandals in the US in late 
1990, stock exchange authorities imposed firms to 
performed Good Corporate Governance (GCG), 
including firm wishing to go public. Guest (2008) 
suggests one of potential aspect in GCG mecha-
nism is the presence of Board of Commissioners 
(BoC). A well structure BoC is expected to reduce 
manager opportunistic behavior in performing 
earnings management. BoC characteristic, in 
particular its composition, should effectively 
have contributed to the production of qualified 
financial reports that will hinder or reduce 
possibility of financial misrepresentation. 
Aharony et al. (1993) did not find a strong 
evidence of earnings management in the US IPOs, 
but others, such as Friedlan (1994), Neill et al. 
(1995), Magnan and Cournier (1997) or Teoh et al. 
(1998) did. Tykova (2006) find the evidence in 
Germany. In  Indonesia, Gumanti (2001) examines 
IPO firms between 1995 and 1997 and finds no 
evidence of earnings management a year prior to 
the IPO, but shows strong evidence in period two 
years prior to IPO. Saiful (2004) and Joni (2008) 
report strong evidence of earnings management in 
Indonesian IPOs.  
Studies have found negative relationship 
between BoC and earnings management. Saleh et 
al. (2005) and Rahman and Ali (2006) document 
the evidence in Malaysian public firms, whilst 
Peasnell et al. (2005) in UK, and Klein (2002) in 
the US. In Indonesia, Guna and Herawati (2010) 
do not find that the presence of independent BoC 
affect earnings management.  
Study examining the presence of dual role of 
BoC and Board of Director (BoD) in reducing the 
level of earnings management in an IPO setting is 
limited. One of it is Saleh et al (2005) who find that 
duality role of BoD positively affect earnings mana-
gement.  
Motivated by previous finding and limited 
evidence on the issue of corporate governance and 
IPO, this study examines the effect of duality role 
of BoC on earnings management in Indonesian 
IPO firms during 2000-2006.  
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Earnings management is a widespread pheno-
menon. It is found in various setting, including in 
an IPO. The issuers’ intention of gaining larger 
proceeds from IPO has led to opportunistic 
behavior by inflating reported income. Friedlan 
(1994), Teoh et al. (1998), and Tykova 2006, among 
others, document evidence of earnings mana-
gement sin the periods prior to IPO date. In 
Indonesia, Gumanti (2001) and Amin (2007) find 
such evidence. 
BoCs monitor the firm (i.e., the Directors) to 
ascertain that the firm is managed properly. BoC 
has exclusive independency aside of BoD. Accord-
ing to stewardship theory, to improve firm perfor-
mance there seems to be a need of the duality role 
of the BoC and BoD of which BoC may have 
intervention to BoD in ascertaining the achieve-
ment of firm’s goals (Rechner dan Dalton, 1991). 
Saleh et al. (2005) show that firm with duality role 
of BoC and BoD have positive effect on earnings 
management. Whilst, Klein (2002) shows that 
directors having more power over the BoC have 
higher motivation to manage reported earnings. It 
seems that duality role has positive effect on 
earnings management. This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
H1: Duality role of Board of Commissioner incre-
ases the level of earnings management of IPO 
firms 
 
The effect of BoC size on earnings manage-
ment is mixed though it has significant effect on 
firm performance (Pierce and Zahra, 1992). Rah-
man and Ali (2006) show larger size of BoC does 
not lead to effective monitoring and solve problem 
of the firm in Malaysia. Yermack (1996) finds 
negative effect of size of BoC on CEO’s misconduct. 
Beasley (1996) conclude that lower BoC size leads 
to more effective monitoring. Larger BoC is seemed 
to be less effective in playing their roles as there 
are communication problems, coordination, and 
decision making. Conversely, Dalton et al. (1999) 
and Bradbury et al. (2006) contend larger BoC size 
will provide better business management that will 
limit the level of earnings management. Based on 
this contention, the following hypothesis is pro-
posed:  
H2:  Larger size of Board of Commissioner reduces 
the level earnings management of IPO firms 
 
BoC effectiveness as balancing power of CEO 
is heavily affected by their independency. Agency 
theory supports the view that to improve BoC 
independency, the board shall be dominated by 
outside directors. The presence of outside directors 
is needed to monitor and control directors’ actions 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Non executive direc-
tors will affect decision making to improve firms’ 
performance (Zahra dan Pearce, 1998). Thus, 
management is forced to take responsibility and 
consider the interest of shareholders or stake-
holders.  
Fama and Jensen (1983) state that indepen-
dent commissioner could help overcoming potential 
conflict between managers and control and provide 
consideration to management of the firm. Indepen-
dent commissioner is in good position for monitor-
ing process so to ascertain that good corporate 
government is in place, which in turn could reduce 
the use of discretionary accruals (Cornett et al., 
2006).  This leads to the following hypothesis:  
H3:  The presence of independent Board of 
Commissioner reduces the level of earnings 
management of IPO firms 
 
Firm size is examined in line with political 
cost hypothesis’ view that large firms tend to lower 
profit potential by managing accruals. The study 
predicts that firm size will have negative effect on 
earnings management of IPOs. Debt covenant 
hypothesis predicts that firms with large leverage 
will have greater incentive to increase reported 
earnings through income increasing discretionary 
accruals (Godfrey and Koh, 2003. Thus it is pre-
dicted that firms’ leverage will have positive 
relation with earnings management of IPOs.  
Dechow et al. (1995) and Kaznik (1999) assert 
that profitability is positively related to discre-
tionary accruals. In an IPO context, profitability 
seems to be one of key aspects where investors rely 
the value of the firm from its ability to generate 
profits. This will motivate issuers to pay more 
attention on profitability (Healy and Wahlen, 
1999). Teoh et al. (1998) provide support of this 
prediction. Thus, it is predicted that profitability is 
positively related to earnings management of IPOs. 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
  
Indonesia IPO firms that went public in 
Indonesia stock exchange from 2000 to 2006 were 
the target of this study. A total 112 IPO firms were 
identified. Firm is excluded if its prospectus 
contain less than three years of financial reports. 
Further, financial, insurance, and real estate firms 
were excluded. The firm shall have at least four 
firms members in the same sub-sector as the study 
employs sub-sector industry in estimating discre-
tionary current accruals. 
A modified Jones model (1991) adjusting for 
industry sector was employed to measure discre-
tionnary accruals (Bradbury et al, 2006; Rahman 
and Ali, 2006; Tykova, 2006), as performing a time 
series model is impossible given limited number of 
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observation. This means the study estimates 
current accrual and non-discretionary current 
accruals based on each sub-sector (firm j) in year t 
using all financial report of the firm in the same 
sub-sector except the issuing firm. The procedures 
are as follows: 
a. Nondiscretionary accruals is derived using the 
following formula: 
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where CAjk,t
 
is current accruals, TAjk,t-1
 
is total 
assets, REVjk,t
 
is difference of sales, NDCAji,t is 
nondiscretionary accruals component, TAji,t-1
 
is 
total asset, REVji,t
 
isdifference of income of 
IPO, TRji,t
 
is difference in account receivable, 
DCAji,t is discretionary current accruals, CAjk,t is 
current accruals, and j, k, t indicate sub-sector j, 
firm k, and the period, respectively. 
 
Duality role of BoC (DUAL) is dummy 
variable, the score would be one if the firm has BoC 
with dual roles, otherwise zero (Saleh et al., 2005). 
Size of BoC is measured as the number of BoC 
(Beiner et al., 2004). The presence of independent 
BoC is a dummy variable, firm with independent 
BoC would be labeled 1, otherwise 0. Firm size is 
measured using LnTotal Assets (Bradbury et al., 
2006). Leverage is measured as the ratio of long 
term liabilities over total assets. Profitability is 
measured as the ratio of operating profit before tax 
over total asset at the end of final year prior to IPO 
(Saleh et al., 2005). The following regression model 
is employed. 
DCA =  b0 + b1DUAL + b2SC + b3IND + b4FS + 
b5LEV+ b6PRO + e 
where DCA is discretionary current accruals, 
DUAL is duality role of BoC, SC is size of BoC, 
IND is independent BoC, FS is firm size, LEV is 
Leverage, and Pro is profitability.  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
Table 1 shows the sample firms selection 
process. A total of 60 IPOs from 112 IPOs during 
2000-2006 meet the selection criteria excluding 
IPOs in financial, real estate and property indus-
try, IPOs with insufficient member of sub-sector, 
and IPOs with extreme DAC values. 
Table 1. Sample Determination Process  
No. Description Number of firms 
1. Firms making IPO (year 2000-
2006) 
 112 
2. Firms in finance, insurance, and 
real estate industry 
   41  _ 
3. Firms having less than three 
years financial reports. 
    3   _ 
4. Firms with less than three 
firms member in the same sub-
sector 
    3   _ 
5. Firms with extreme DCS and 
negative equity 
    5   _ 
6. Final Sample   60 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Variables (n=60) 
Descrip-
tion 
DCA DUAL SC IND FS LEV PRO 
Mean -0.3559 0.7667 3.4000 0.3500 11.0957 0.1787 0.0751 
Standard 
Error 
0.2302 0.0551 0.1750 0.0621 0.1003 0.0273 0.0188 
Median -0.0450 1.0000 3.0000 0.0000 10.9889 0.1136 0.0505 
Standard 
Deviation 
1.7833 0.4265 1.3555 0.4810 0.7769 0.2115 0.1453 
Minimum -7.5186 0.0000 2.0000 0.0000 9.2480 0.0000 -0.2391 
Maximum 6.3706 1.0000 10.0000 1.0000 12.8112 0.8335 0.6147 
Notes: 
DCA = discretionary current accruals, DUAL = duality 
role of BoC, SC = Size of BoC, IND = Independent BoC, 
FS = firm size, LEV = leverage, PRO = Profitability. 
 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of varia-
bles. There are 46 firms with dual role, i.e., being a 
commissioner and director and 21 firms have 
independent BoC at IPO date. Average DCA is 
negative indicating IPOs tend to make income 
decreasing discretionary accruals in the period 
before the IPO, where a total of 35 firms have 
negative DCA. This is in contrast to Hastoro and 
Yuliana (2010) who found positive and significant 
discretionary accruals prior IPOs of 32 firms over 
2000-2008. 
Pearson correlation matrix is shown in Table 
3. Duality role of BoC has significant and negative 
correlation with DAC (p<0.01), firm size correlates 
positively with DCA (p<0,05) and the presence of 
independent BoC has positive correlation with 
DCA (p<0,10). Firm size is positively correlated 
with size of BoC (p<0.01) indicating the larger the 
firm size the larger the number of BoC. Firm size, 
leverage, and profitability are found to have no 
significant correlation with the level of discretion-
nary accruals. Other findings show that larger 
firms tend to have larger leverage. In addition, 
larger firms tend to have larger number of size of 
Board of Commissioner. 
Table 4 shows the results of hypotheses 
testing. The results reported in Table 4 confirm the 
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finding shown in Table 3 concerning the correlation 
between duality role (DUAL) and the level of 
discretionary accruals (DAC). The coefficient of 
duality role of BoC is positive and significant 
(p<0.01). Size of BoC affects DAC positively at 
traditional level, it is in contrast to the prediction 
(p<0.10). Profitability positively affects earnings 
management (p<0.05). Other variables, i.e., the 
presence of independent BoC, firm size, and 
leverage do not have significant effect on earnings 
management in IPOs. 
This study shows that when IPO firms have 
BoC who is also being the director, or termed to 
have dual role, they have has to perform 
monitoring the firm as well as being the agent. It 
appears that BoC are unable to performed dual 
role, i.e., as monitoring and governing. This leads 
to the higher earnings management. The reported 
result is consistent with Saleh et al. (2005). It 
indicates that BoC having more than one role 
tends to have lower level of monitoring. The dual 
function will split the concentration and their focus 
on responsibility as well handling problems making 
the control and monitoring function on mana-
gement less optimal so that earnings management 
occurs. 
A deeper examination shows that some of 
BoC of IPO firms have similar role in more than 
two other firms. This condition has lessened the 
time allocated to monitor firm’s management. 
The findings reported here is robust in terms 
of the significant relationship between duality role 
of BoC and earnings management under various 
regression models. This means that the finding is 
not affected by other independent variables.  
 
Table 3. Correlation Matrix of Variables 
Variable  DCA DUAL SC IND FS LEV 
DUAL  0.3839a      
SC  0.2310b  0.0762     
IND  0.1873c  0.1569 0.3535a    
FS  0.0506  0.0060 0.5418a  0.4151a   
LEV -0.0274  0.0538 0.1131  0.1746c 0.3827a  
PRO  0.1109 -0.1932b 0.0441 -0.1509 0.1287 0.0623 
a, b, c indicate significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Notes: 
DCA = discretionary current accruals, DUAL = duality role of BoC, SC = Size of BoC, IND = Independent BoC, 
FS = firm size, LEV = leverage, PRO = Profitability. 
 
Table 4. Results of Regression Analyses 
Description Prediction Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
DUAL + 
1.6324 
(3.1733)a 
1.6477 
(3.2321)a 
1.4816 
(2.8653) a 
1.4689 
(2.8680) a 
1.5039 
(2.9572) a 
SC - 
0.2903 
(1.5187)c 
0.2069 
(1.2336) 
0.2976 
(1.5274) c 
0.3077 
(1.6052) c 
0.2366 
(1.4000) c 
IND - 
0.5539 
(1.0875) 
0.3681 
(0.7667) 
0.3732 
(0.7337) 
0.3671 
(0.7277) 
0.2494 
(0.5189) 
FS - 
-0.3184 
(-0.8599) 
- 
-0.2193 
(-0.5878) 
-0.2739 
(-0.7949) 
- 
LEV + 
-0.5068 
(-0.4614) 
- 
-0.4473 
(-0.3996) 
- - 
PRO + 
2.7089 
(1.7645)b 
2.3939 
(1.5927)c 
- - - 
Adj.R2  0.1628 0.1717 0.1301 0.1434 0.1489 
F-value 
(p=value) 
 2.9126 
(0.0157) 
4.0579 
(0.0059) 
2.7642 
(0.0270) 
2.7642 
(0.0270) 
4.4430 
(0.0072) 
Durbin-Watson  2.335 2.265 2.192 2.159 2.141 
a, b, c indicate significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Notes: 
DCA = discretionary current accruals, DUAL = duality role of BoC, SC = Size of BoC, IND = Independent BoC, FS = 
firm size, LEV = leverage, PRO = Profitability. Models 2 to 5 are presented for comparison purpose. 
JURNAL AKUNTANSI DAN KEUANGAN, VOL. 13, NO. 2, NOVEMBER 2011: 80-86 
 
84 
The study shows that size of BoC has positive 
coefficient on DAC. This means that the larger the 
size of BoC the higher is the level of earnings 
management. This contradicts with the prior the 
expectation that the more the BOC's members 
lower the level of earnings management as the 
monitoring power increases (Dalton et al., 1999; 
Bradbury et al., 2006). This finding should be 
treated with caution. It seems that the presence of 
BoC does not effective in preventing management 
for conducting any action whichaffects earnings 
management. The question raised in relation to the 
finding reported here is that there is no guarantee 
that larger size of BoC could be effective in moni-
toring the management of firm. 
Profitability is positively related to earnings 
management. This finding supports the previous 
reports that IPO firms tend to make income which 
increases discretionary accruals (Friedland 1993; 
Teoh et al. 1998). This implies that reported 
earnings can give sightsthat the issuing firms are 
profitable. Out of 60 sample firms, only 12 firms 
reported loss in their financial reports prior to IPO. 
Godfrey and Koh (2003) conversely reported nega-
tive coefficient of profitability in Australian IPOs. 
This study does not find that the presence of 
independent BoC reduces the level of earnings 
management. Independent BoC seems to have low 
or even no control of management given the fact 
that her presence is voluntary. Some may pessi-
mistically view that the function of independent 
BoC of firms making IPO is just to meet the sug-
gestion imposed by the capital market governing 
body. Whether its existence is just a part of 
obedience or to meet a good governance is still 
questionable. 
Unlike Aharony et al. (1993), who found that 
smaller firms tend to make income increasing 
discretionary accruals, this study does not find any 
evidence that firm size is related to earnings 
management. Dividing the sample firm into small 
and large firms shows that the average DCA of 
small firms is 0.5472 and for larger firms is -0.1645 
and the difference is not statistically significance 
(t=-0.8716; p=0.1953). Thus, it appears that 
accounting earnings of IPO firms do not affect 
management intention to manage reported earnings 
through discretionary accruals. 
The study finds that leverage level is not 
associated with earnings management. This is in 
contrast to DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) who 
document that larger firms tend to make income 
increasing discretionary accruals as an effort to 
improve earnings performance. Godfrey and Koh 
(2003) find positive and significant effect of leve-
rage on discretionary accruals in Australian IPOs. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
  
Duality role of BoC is found to be positively 
related to earnings management in Indonesian 
IPOs. This indicates that when IPO firms have 
BoC who is not only being a commissioner but also 
being a director, the incidence of earnings manage-
ment is getting intense as a result of weakening 
monitoring role. The number of BoC is also posi-
tively related to earnings management along with 
firms’ profitability. The presence of independent 
BoC, firm size, and leverage do not have effect on 
earnings management level. 
Some cautions merit attention. First, this 
study uses cross-sectional base estimation of 
discretionary accruals used by firms in the same 
sub-sector. It may not be a good measure given 
existing firms may have better financial structure 
and lower intension to manage earnings. Studies 
estimating earnings management level have used 
various measures (Beneish, 1998) and as noted by 
Ronen and Yaari (2008), there are various mea-
sures of discretionary accruals that have been 
employed in earnings management studies, making it 
possible to obtain different results when studying 
earnings management. 
The study does not explicitly examine the role 
of BoC in reducing earnings management. So, this 
study is unable to differentiate whether earnings 
management is caused by the nature or the 
evaporating role of BoC. 
Some suggestions are put forward. First, 
future study may compare the level of earnings 
management between sectors by considering two 
state of the market that is during bull and bear 
IPO market to seek evidence whether earnings 
management is related to the IPO cycle. Using 
other estimation in measuring discretionary 
accruals is also recommended by adjusting the 
number of IPO firms, either using market or sector 
base, not sub-sector as used in this study, or by 
using IPO base year. Future study may also 
examine whether there is difference in terms of the 
magnitude of discretionary accruals between before 
and after IPO. Roosenboom et al. (2003) show 
strong evidence on profit decrease after IPO in the 
Netherlands and Teoh et al. (1998) in the US IPOs. 
Comparison between before and after IPO may 
strengthen the findings of previous studies of 
common earnings management practice in IPO 
setting. The Indonesian capital market governing 
body shall consider banning firm with duality role 
so BoC’s monitoring role could be more effective 
leading to lowering the possibility of earnings 
management in IPO firms. 
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